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______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Petitioner-appellant Bassam Saliba (“Saliba”) obtained 
Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) in 1992 in this country by 
providing falsified documents with his application indicating 
that he was a citizen of Lebanon.  Saliba was, in reality, a native 
and citizen of Syria, a country whose citizens at that time were 
not eligible for TPS.  Nine years later, in 2001, Saliba was able 
to adjust his status to that of a legal permanent resident (“LPR”). 
 Even though Saliba’s fraudulent procurement of TPS should 
have rendered him statutorily “inadmissible” under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(C)(i) and thus not eligible for LPR status, the former 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) mistakenly 
granted him that status.  But when Saliba applied for 
naturalization in 2006, the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) discovered that he had 
obtained TPS by submitting a fraudulent application and denied 
his application for naturalization for that reason.  In explaining 
the reason for its action the USCIS pointed out that Saliba’s 
apparent fraud precluded a finding that he had been “lawfully 
admitted” as a permanent resident as required for naturalization 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a).  Saliba filed a second unsuccessful 
naturalization application following which he filed a petition for 
review of the denial of his application for naturalization in the 
District Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c).   
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 In the District Court, respondents-appellees, the Attorney 
General of the United States and various USCIS officials 
(collectively, “the Government”), moved to dismiss Saliba’s 
petition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 
and, in the  alternative, moved for summary judgment, on the 
ground that Saliba is statutorily ineligible for naturalization.  
The Court on September 18, 2015, granted the Government’s 
motion to dismiss Saliba’s petition.  Thereafter, Saliba timely 
filed a notice of appeal to this Court.  After our review of the 
case, we conclude that Saliba’s fraudulent procurement of TPS 
in 1992 made him inadmissible for LPR status, and, because he 
had not been “lawfully admitted” for permanent residence, he 
cannot be naturalized.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District 
Court’s September 18, 2015 order dismissing Saliba’s petition 
for review.1  
 
 
II.  STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1421(c), which provides that an individual whose application for 
naturalization is denied may “seek review of such denial before 
the United States district court for the district in which such 
person resides.”  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291, because the District Court’s September 18, 2015 order 
constituted a final order. 
                                                 
1 Two panels of this Court are filing opinions in Koszelnik v. 
Secretary, No. 14-4816, and Saliba v. Attorney General, No. 15-
3769, on this day dealing with similar issues.  Each opinion is a 
further precedent supporting the other opinion. 
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III.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 
 
 Saliba is a native and citizen of Syria.  (Petition for 
Review (“Pet.”) ¶ 6).  He entered the United States on or about 
December 25, 1988, (Pet. ¶ 12), on a non-immigrant student 
visa, Saliba v. Att’y Gen., No. CIV. A. 14-6174 KSH, 2015 WL 
5554772, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2015).  In or around January 
1992, he filed for TPS3 claiming to be a citizen of Lebanon and 
                                                 
2 Inasmuch as this case is on appeal from an order granting a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we recite the facts on the basis 
of the allegations in Saliba’s petition for review, which we 
accept as true on this appeal.  See James v. City of Wilkes–
Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 
3 The Attorney General has authority to grant TPS to eligible 
foreign nationals if she finds that their origin countries are 
experiencing ongoing armed conflict, environmental disaster, or 
other extraordinary and temporary conditions.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1254a(b)(1)(A)-(C).  The Attorney General may designate a 
foreign country, or a particular part of such country, only “after 
consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1254a(b).  During the time that TPS remains in effect 
with respect to a particular country as an eligible under the TPS 
program, individuals awarded that status by reason of that 
country’s designation are not required to leave the United States 
and may obtain work authorization.  8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1)(A)-
(B).  The Attorney General may terminate an alien’s TPS if she 
determines that the alien’s country of origin no longer meets the 
conditions for designation under the statute.  8 U.S.C. § 
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“submitted falsified documents which stated [that] he was a 
citizen of Lebanon.”  (Pet. ¶ 13).  Saliba alleges that he decided 
to submit these falsified documents with his TPS application 
because the “state of war” that existed at that time in the Middle 
East made him “fear for his life.”4  (Pet. ¶ 14).  Despite these 
falsified documents—or more accurately, by reason of them—
the “Immigration and Naturalization Service” (“INS”) granted 
Saliba TPS status.  Saliba, 2015 WL 5554772, at *1.  Saliba’s 
actual nation of origin, Syria, was not designated as a country 
whose citizens were eligible for TPS at the time that Saliba 
sought the benefit of that status, though it was designated as 
being within that program on March 29, 2012.  See Designation 
of Syrian Arab Republic for Temporary Protected Status, 77 
                                                                                                             
1254a(b)(3)(B).   The statutory process contemplates that if the 
Attorney General terminates a country’s eligibility for  TPS 
designation, individuals with that designation from that country 
return to the same immigration status that they previously held 
(unless that status has expired or been terminated) or to any 
other status they may have been granted while registered for 
TPS.  E.g., Designation of El Salvador Under Temporary 
Protected Status Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 14214 (Mar. 9, 2001).   
 
4 The District Court stated that Saliba submitted a fraudulent 
Lebanese passport and birth certificate as part of his TPS 
application.  Saliba, 2015 WL 5554772, at *1.  In his briefing, 
Saliba acknowledges that he submitted a fraudulent Lebanese 
passport but claims that he never submitted a Lebanese birth 
certificate.  Appellant’s br. at 9; Appellant’s Reply br. at 6.  
Saliba’s contention on this point is immaterial as his petition 
concedes that he “submitted falsified documents which stated he 
was a citizen of Lebanon.”  (Pet. ¶ 13). 
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Fed. Reg. 19026-01 (Mar. 29, 2012).  
 
 Seven years later, on July 22, 1999, Saliba filed an I-485 
application to register as a permanent resident or to adjust his 
status to that of a LPR.  (Pet. ¶ 17).  As part of his I-485 
application, Saliba submitted documents that accurately 
identified him as a native and citizen of Syria and provided his 
date of entry into the United States.  (Pet. ¶ 18).  His responses 
on the application itself, however, were less accurate.  For 
example, the District Court found significant that Saliba wrote 
“NONE” in the space on the application that requested the 
applicant’s existing A number, i.e., his registration number, and 
when asked in Question 10 on Part 3 of the application whether 
he “by fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact, ever 
sought to procure, or procured . . . any other immigration 
benefit,” Saliba answered “NO.”  Saliba, 2015 WL 5554772, at 
*1 (citing the Borgen Decl., Ex. C).  
  
 Saliba had an obvious motive to provide dishonest 
responses on his I-485 application.  If his fraudulent 
procurement of TPS and his existing A number came to light at 
the time that he applied to adjust his status to a LPR, he would 
have been rendered statutorily “inadmissible” under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(C)(i) and therefore ineligible to become a LPR.  
Saliba’s petition does not address his inaccurate responses on his 
I-485 application, but, instead, alleges that the “USCIS had the 
information about his prior TPS application, [] [because] they 
crossed out the old A number through the Temporary Protected 
Status application that was on the I-485 Application and wrote 
in a new A number.”5  (Pet. ¶ 20).  He asserts that the INS’s 
                                                 
5 Saliba’s briefing further expands on his allegation that the INS 
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apparent replacement of his old A number with a new A number 
constituted a waiver of his inadmissibility pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(c)(iii).  (Pet. ¶ 22).  Regardless of whether Saliba’s 
contentions have merit, on February 14, 2001, the INS approved 
his application and his status was adjusted to that of a LPR.  
(Pet. ¶ 21).  
 
 Five years later, on February 23, 2006, Saliba applied for 
naturalization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a).  (Pet. ¶ 24).  But 
the USCIS denied his application on January 22, 2008, because 
it determined that he had not been lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence.  (Pet. ¶ 25).  In particular, the USCIS 
concluded that Saliba was not lawfully admitted to the United 
States for permanent residence because, at the time of his 
adjustment to that status, he was excludable/inadmissible 
pursuant to INA § 212(a)(6)(c)(i)6 based on his TPS fraud.  (Pet. 
                                                                                                             
waived his inadmissibility after being apprised of his TPS fraud. 
 For example, Saliba asserts that his “TPS A number was written 
into the [I-485] application, and then crossed out by USCIS and 
the new number associated with the I-485 Application written in 
its place in completely different handwriting.”  Appellant’s br. at 
2.  He further claims that the Government submitted a copy of 
his I-485 with its motion to dismiss which is “inconsistent and 
obscures this Court’s ability to determine when the marks on the 
application were added” and when “various color pens” were 
used on the application.  Appellant’s Reply br. at 2.  
 
6 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(C)(i), states the following: “Any alien who, by fraud 
or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or 
has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other 
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¶ 25 & Ex. A, at 2). 
 
 Two months later, on March 26, 2008, the USCIS issued 
Saliba a notice to appear before an immigration judge (“IJ”).  
(Pet. ¶ 26).  The notice indicated that Saliba was subject to 
removal based on his submission of a fraudulent Lebanese 
passport and birth certificate to establish TPS eligibility in 1992. 
 (Pet. ¶ 26 & Ex. A, at 2).  On July 8, 2009, however, the IJ 
terminated the removal proceedings because of our holding in 
Garcia v. Attorney General, 553 F.3d 724 (3d Cir. 2009), which 
we decided on January 14, 2009.  (Pet. ¶ 27).  In Garcia, we held 
that a five-year statute of limitations for rescission of LPR status 
also applies to the initiation of removal proceedings predicated 
on the circumstance that the alien improperly obtained LPR 
status.  553 F.3d at 728-29.  
 
 On March 19, 2012, Saliba filed a second application for 
naturalization.  (Pet. ¶ 29).  The USCIS denied this second 
application ten months later, on January 22, 2013, because of its 
prior conclusion that Saliba’s submission of falsified Lebanese 
documents with his TPS application rendered him statutorily 
inadmissible for naturalization.  (Pet. ¶ 30).  Saliba filed a Form 
N-336, Request for Hearing on a Decision in Naturalization 
Proceedings on February 26, 2013, which resulted in a hearing 
on April 30, 2013.  (Pet. ¶¶  31, 32).  But on June 5, 2014, the 
USCIS reaffirmed its denial of Saliba’s second application for 
naturalization.  (Pet. ¶ 33).   
 
 On October 3, 2014, Saliba filed a timely petition in the 
                                                                                                             
documentation, or admission into the United States or other 
benefit provided under this chapter is inadmissible.” 
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District Court for review of the USCIS’s denial of his second 
application for naturalization.  In his petition, Saliba first asserts 
that the misrepresentations that he made in his application for 
TPS were immaterial and not willful.  (E.g., Pet. ¶¶ 37, 38, 40).  
In addition, Saliba maintains that even if his misrepresentations 
were material, the INS waived his inadmissibility when it 
granted him LPR status, and the USCIS implicitly waived his 
inadmissibility through its subsequent failure to rescind his LPR 
status within the five-year statutory window for taking such an 
action.  (E.g., Pet. ¶¶ 36, 39, 43, 44, 57, 58).  On December 23, 
2014, the Government moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, moved for summary 
judgment.  
  
 Nine months later, on September 18, 2015, the District 
Court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss.  Saliba, 
2015 WL 5554772, at *7.  It determined that the USCIS 
properly denied Saliba’s application for naturalization because 
he was not “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” on 
account of his fraudulent procurement of TPS.  Id. at *6.  The 
Court further concluded that Saliba did not obtain a waiver of 
inadmissibility because “even if the INS was aware of Saliba’s 
TPS application when it adjudicated [his] application to adjust 
status, he was ineligible for a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), 
and the Service did not have the legal authority to waive 
inadmissibility on any other grounds.”  Id. at *5.  It also rejected 
Saliba’s contention that the USCIS’s failure to rescind his LPR 
status and initiate removal proceedings within the five-year 
statute of limitations period constituted an implicit waiver of 
inadmissibility for purposes of naturalization.  Id. at *5-6.  
Specifically, the Court reasoned that “the Garcia decision is 
limited to removal/rescission proceedings and has no application 
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to petitions for naturalization.”  Id. at *6.  The Court thus 
dismissed Saliba’s petition, and on November 6, 2015, Saliba 
timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court. 
 
    
IV.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 Our review of a district court’s dismissal of a petition for 
review under Rule 12(b)(6) is plenary.  See Chavarriaga v. N.J. 
Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 2015).  We first 
“tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a 
claim.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 
1947 (2009).  Then, we identify the allegations that, “because 
they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the 
assumption of truth.”  Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.  Finally, we 
assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations and 
“determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 
relief.”  Id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (explaining that a plaintiff 
must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face”).  In making this determination, “[w]e 
consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, 
matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic 
documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these 
documents.”  Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 
716 F.3d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
V.  JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NATURALIZATION 
DENIALS 
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 We review naturalization denials through a distinct lens.  
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), a district court’s “review shall 
be de novo, and the court shall make its own findings of fact and 
conclusions of law . . . .”  As a consequence, judicial review of 
naturalization denials “is not limited to any administrative 
record but rather may be on facts established in and found by the 
district court de novo.”  Aparicio v. Blakeway, 302 F.3d 437, 
445 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Abulkhair v. Bush, 413 F. App’x 
502, 507-08 (3d Cir. 2011).  
 Significantly, an applicant for naturalization has the 
burden of proving “by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
or she meets all of the requirements for naturalization.”  8 
C.F.R. § 316.2(b); see also Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 
256-57 (3d Cir. 2005); Abulkhair, 413 F. App’x at 508.  
“[S]trict compliance with all the congressionally imposed 
prerequisites to” citizenship is required, Fedorenko v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 490, 506, 101 S.Ct. 737, 747 (1981); United 
States v. Szehinskyj, 277 F.3d 331, 334 (3d Cir. 2002), and “the 
burden is on the alien applicant to show his eligibility for 
citizenship in every respect,” INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 
886, 108 S.Ct. 2210, 2217-18 (1988) (quoting Berenyi v. Dist. 
Dir., INS, 385 U.S. 630, 637, 87 S.Ct. 666, 670-671 (1967)).  
Thus, as the Supreme Court has explained, “when doubts exist 
concerning a grant of [citizenship], generally at least, they 
should be resolved in favor of the United States and against the 
claimant.”  United States v. Manzi, 276 U.S. 463, 467, 48 S.Ct. 
328, 329 (1928) (citation omitted); see also Bagot, 398 F.3d at 
257; Ogundoju v. Att’y Gen., 390 F. App’x 134, 137 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
VI.  DISCUSSION 
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 Saliba maintains that he did not willingly make any 
material misrepresentations to obtain TPS, and that, even if he 
did, the INS and USCIS waived any bar to his admissibility 
attributable to his misrepresentations when they granted him 
LPR status and did not rescind that status within the five-year 
statute of limitations period for taking such action.  We 
conclude, as did the District Court, that Saliba’s misstatements 
at the time that he applied for TPS were necessarily material—
making him statutorily “inadmissible” for permanent 
residence—and that Saliba neither applied for nor obtained a 
waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1).  
Accordingly, Saliba was not “lawfully admitted” for permanent 
residence and we are constrained to affirm the District Court’s 
September 18, 2015 order dismissing his petition for review. 
 
 A.  Saliba Obtained TPS by Fraud and is  
          thus “Inadmissible” for Permanent Residence 
 
 We divide the issue that we examine on this appeal—
whether Saliba is eligible for naturalization—into three sub-
issues.  The first sub-issue is whether Saliba obtained TPS by 
fraud or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact, because, 
unless he did so, the Government has no basis to claim that 
Saliba was not “lawfully admitted” for permanent residence 
when he adjusted his status to that of a LPR in 2001.  
 
 To adjust his status so that he would be a LPR, i.e., to 
become lawfully admitted for permanent residence, Saliba had 
to be, among other requirements, “admissible to the United 
States for permanent residence” at the time of his adjustment.  8 
U.S.C. § 1255(a).  Significantly, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(C)(i) an alien who, “by fraud or willfully 
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misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought 
to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or 
admission into the United States or other benefit,” is statutorily 
inadmissible for permanent residenceemphasis added).  
Inasmuch as it is undisputable that TPS is an “other benefit” 
within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), the question 
before us with respect to Saliba obtaining a benefit is whether he 
obtained TPS “by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material 
fact.”   8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).   The District Court 
concluded that Saliba’s misrepresentations of his citizenship 
when he applied for TPS were necessarily material to his 
procurement of that status.  See Saliba, 2015 WL 5554772, at *4 
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) and Aoko v. Holder, 518 F. 
App’x 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2013)); Appellees’ br. at 17-18.  We 
agree.  
 
 Saliba admits in his petition that, prior to adjusting his 
status, he obtained TPS by submitting falsified documents 
stating that he was a Lebanese citizen.  (See Pet. ¶ 13).  These 
admittedly falsified documents were unquestionably material7 to 
                                                 
7 A fact is material if: (1) “the alien is excludable on the true 
facts,” Mwongera v. INS, 187 F.3d 323, 330 (3d Cir. 1999); (2) 
“the misrepresentation tends to shut off a line of inquiry which 
is relevant to the alien’s eligibility and which might well have 
resulted in a proper determination that he be excluded,” id.; or 
(3) the misrepresentations “had a natural tendency to influence 
the decisions of the” decision-making body to which it was 
presented.  Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 772, 108 
S.Ct. 1537, 1547 (1988).  As we explain, an alien’s citizenship 
is necessarily material with respect to his application for a 
country-specific immigration benefit such as TPS.  It defies 
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Saliba’s procurement of TPS because the Government did not 
designate his home country, Syria, as an eligible country under 
the TPS program until 2012.  See Designation of Syrian Arab 
Republic for Temporary Protected Status, 77 Fed. Reg. 19026-
01.  Thus, Saliba could not have been granted TPS if he had 
submitted legitimate documents, and his concededly “clear 
misrepresentation” of the facts (Pet. ¶ 44) and 
“misrepresent[ation] of his nationality to obtain Temporary 
Protected Status,” (Pet. ¶ 22), rendered him inadmissible for 
permanent residence as a matter of law.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(C)(i).  
 
 Saliba resists this conclusion by stating that his decision 
to submit falsified Lebanese documents was involuntary and 
made under duress, due to his fear of the war-time conditions 
plaguing the Middle East at the time of his TPS application.  
Appellant’s br. at 8; (see also Pet. ¶¶ 14, 37) (“At the time of the 
Temporary Protected Status application, the Middle East . . . was 
in a state of war, and [Saliba] acted in fear for his life.”).  Saliba 
thus claims that, even if the fact of his Syrian citizenship was 
material, he did not “willfully misrepresent[]” his citizenship to 
obtain TPS.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (emphasis added).  
This argument fails because the willfulness of his 
misrepresentation is not mitigated by external circumstances.  
                                                                                                             
logic to claim that Saliba’s submission of falsified documents to 
represent that he was a citizen of Lebanon—a country 
designated under the TPS program at the time of Saliba’s TPS 
application—did not materially contribute to his procurement of 
TPS when he was actually a citizen of Syria, a country not 
designated under the TPS program at that time.  
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Saliba could have sought asylum from Syria rather than 
misrepresent his citizenship to file for TPS.  See generally 8 
U.S.C. § 1150.  Moreover, one of the statutory grounds on 
which the Attorney General may designate a foreign state so that 
its nationals are eligible for TPS is if she makes a finding that 
“there is an ongoing armed conflict within the state and, due to 
such conflict, requiring the return of aliens who are nationals of 
that state to that state (or to the part of the state) would pose a 
serious threat to their personal safety[.]”  8 U.S.C. § 
1254a(b)(1)(A).  At the time that Saliba applied for TPS, the 
Attorney General had not found that there was such an ongoing 
armed conflict in Syria—the foreign state of which Saliba was a 
citizen—that threatened the personal safety of Syrian nationals 
justifying Syria’s designation under the TPS program.  
Accordingly, Saliba’s claimed subjective fear of returning to 
Syria does not provide a basis for us to reach a conclusion that 
his submission of falsified documents to obtain TPS was an 
involuntary act.8  Inasmuch as he obtained TPS “by fraud or 
willfully misrepresenting a material fact,” he was statutorily 
“inadmissible” for permanent residence pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(C)(i), and thus there was a mandatory ground 
                                                 
8 We do not agree with Saliba’s contention that we should apply 
the voluntariness standard used in considering the validity of 
guilty pleas in the criminal context, articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct 
1463, 1469 (1970), in this case.  We reject this contention 
because the circumstances of immigration cases are 
distinguishable from criminal cases.  In any event, it is not clear 
that, despite Saliba’s arguments to the contrary, the application 
of the Brady standard would benefit him.  
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requiring the denial of his application for adjustment of his 
status to that of a LPR.  
 
 B.  Saliba’s Inadmissibility for Permanent  
 Residence Renders him Unable to Naturalize 
 
 As we have indicated, the INS mistakenly granted Saliba 
LPR status despite his statutory inadmissibility.  (See Pet. ¶ 21). 
 This circumstance gives rise to the second sub-issue on appeal: 
whether, notwithstanding his current LPR status, Saliba’s 
statutory inadmissibility for permanent residence means that he 
never was “lawfully admitted” for permanent residence—a 
prerequisite to naturalization.9  Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1429, “no 
person shall be naturalized unless he has been lawfully admitted 
to the United States for permanent residence in accordance with 
all applicable provisions of this chapter.”  See also id. § 1427(a) 
(“No person . . . shall be naturalized unless such applicant . . . 
has resided [in the United States] continuously, after being 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . .”).  Because 
Saliba was inadmissible for permanent residence based on a 
mandatory statutory ground, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), the 
Government maintains that although he must be regarded as 
having been admitted for permanent residence by reason of the 
expiration of the five-year period for rescinding his LPR status, 
he was not lawfully admitted. 
                                                 
9 Though the Government acknowledges that our holding in 
Garcia precludes it from now rescinding Saliba’s LPR status or 
removing him, it contends that Saliba is nonetheless 
“inadmissible” for naturalization because he never was 
“lawfully admitted” for permanent residence.  See, e.g., 
Appellees’ br. at 24.  We deal later with this point in detail.   
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   Section 1101(a)(20) of Title 8 of the United States Code 
defines the term “lawfully admitted” as “the status of having 
been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in 
the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the 
immigration laws, such status not having changed.”  We have 
explained that “the term ‘lawfully’ denotes compliance with 
substantive legal requirements, not mere procedural regularity.” 
 Gallimore v. Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 216, 223 & n.6 (3d Cir. 
2010) (citation and internal editorial marks omitted); see also, 
e.g., Arellano-Garcia v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1183, 1187 (8th Cir. 
2005) (“[L]awful status is required, not simply lawful 
procedure.”); Matter of Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1441 (5th Cir. 
1983) (“Admission is not lawful if it is regular only in form.”); 
In Re Koloamatangi, 23 I. & N. Dec. 548, 550 (BIA 2003) 
(same).  “Thus, an alien whose status has been adjusted to 
LPR—but who is subsequently determined to have obtained that 
status adjustment through fraud—has not been ‘lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence’ because the ‘alien is deemed, 
ab initio, never to have obtained [LPR] status.”  Gallimore, 619 
F.3d at 223 (emphasis and alteration in original) (quoting 
Koloamatangi, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 551).   
 Moreover, our emphasis on substance over form in 
determining whether a LPR was “lawfully admitted” for 
permanent residence extends beyond the context of fraud or 
misrepresentations.  As we observed in Gallimore, even 
“[w]here an alien obtains LPR status through administrative 
oversight—despite being ineligible for that status for one reason 
or another—several of our sister courts of appeals have deferred 
to BIA decisions concluding that the alien has not been 
‘lawfully admitted for permanent residence.’”  Id. at 224 & n.6 
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(collecting cases from various courts of appeals).  We joined 
these decisions cited in Gallimore, and held that “an alien whose 
status has been adjusted to lawful permanent resident but who is 
subsequently determined in an immigration proceeding to have 
originally been ineligible for that status has not been ‘lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence.’”  Id. at 224-25 (citations 
omitted).  We were clear that this determination applied 
regardless of whether the applicant’s LPR status was not lawful 
“because the applicant procured it through fraud” or “because 
the applicant was not legally entitled to it for any other reason.”  
Id. at 224; see also Koloamatangi, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 550 (“[A]n 
alien was not ‘lawfully’ admitted for permanent resident status 
if, at the time such status was accorded, he or she was not 
entitled to it.”).  
 Based on our conclusion that Saliba obtained TPS “by 
fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact,” 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(C)(i), it is clear that he never was “lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence” and is thus ineligible for 
naturalization, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a), 1429.  Our precedent is 
clear that, even if the INS erroneously granted Saliba LPR status 
based on his fraudulent application claiming to be a citizen of 
Lebanon or based on his partial misstatements on his I-485 
application for adjustment of status, see Saliba, 2015 WL 
5554772, at *1 (citing the Borgen Decl., Ex. C), the INS’s error 
nevertheless undermines the lawfulness of his LPR status, see 
Gallimore, 619 F.3d at 224-25.  After all, Saliba’s procurement 
of TPS and subsequent adjustment to LPR status are not solely 
attributable to administrative error or circumstances unrelated to 
his fraudulent claims.  Quite to the contrary, by fraudulently 
claiming to be a citizen of Lebanon when he sought TPS he set 
in motion the whole problem regarding his status. 
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 The inescapable fact is that Saliba, as he admits, made a 
“clear misrepresentation” when he “submitted falsified 
documents which stated [that] he was a citizen of Lebanon.”  
(Pet. ¶¶ 13, 44).  Thus, Saliba’s petition removes any doubt that 
he failed to comply with the substantive legal requirements that 
govern applications for TPS.  In addition, Saliba’s  inaccurate 
responses regarding his TPS on his I-485 application for 
adjustment of status to that of a LPR contradict any claim that 
his fraudulent behavior remained confined to his TPS 
application.  Saliba’s fraudulent procurement of his TPS renders 
him “inadmissible” for permanent residence under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(C)(i), and, though the INS mistakenly granted him 
LPR status, a circumstance that shows that lawful procedure was 
followed in his case, the lawfulness of the procedure does not 
mean that he attained lawful status as a LPR.  Rather, lawful 
status as a permanent resident must be established under 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1427(a) and 1429 for an applicant to be eligible for 
naturalization, and because Saliba cannot demonstrate that he 
was “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” as that phrase 
has been interpreted uniformly by the courts of appeals, he 
cannot be naturalized. 
 
 C.  Neither the INS nor the USCIS Waived Saliba’s 
 Inadmissibility 
 
 Our conclusion that Saliba fraudulently procured TPS, 
which rendered him “inadmissible” and not “lawfully admitted” 
for permanent residence, brings us to the third and final sub-
issue in our trilogy: whether the Government waived the barriers 
to his admissibility.  The District Court concluded, and the 
Government maintains on appeal, that there is no evidence in the 
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record to show that Saliba applied for, or ever obtained, a 
waiver of inadmissibility.  Saliba, 2015 WL 5554772, at *5; 
Appellees’ br. at 19.  Saliba responds that a determination of 
whether he “applied for, requested or [was] granted” a waiver is 
a question of fact that “can and should be resolved in 
discovery.”  Appellant’s br. at 10.  Specifically, Saliba contends 
that the INS and the USCIS granted him a waiver when: (1) the 
INS approved his adjustment of status to that of a LPR in 2001 
despite its alleged awareness that he previously had applied for 
TPS under another A number, (e.g., Pet. ¶ 44); and (2) the 
USCIS failed to rescind his LPR status or seek to remove him 
from this country before the expiration of the five-year statute of 
limitations for taking such an action under 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a), 
(e.g., Pet. ¶¶ 42-43).  We do not agree with Saliba that either of 
these considerations, even taken at face value, constitute a 
waiver of inadmissibility.  Saliba never obtained a waiver 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1), which is the sole basis on 
which a waiver may be granted. 
 
  1.  Implicit Waiver by the INS when Saliba  
  became a LPR 
  
 Saliba contends that the reviewing INS officer waived his 
inadmissibility when the INS granted him LPR status in 2001.  
An applicant’s “inadmissibility” under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(C)(i), based on his fraud or willful misrepresentation 
of a material fact, can be waived under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1),10 
which reads as follows:  
                                                 
10 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(iii) authorizes a waiver of 
inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) and directs 
that the applicable waiver provision is 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1). 
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The Attorney General may, in the 
discretion of the Attorney General, 
waive the application of clause (i) 
of subsection (a)(6)(C) of this 
section in the case of an immigrant 
who is the spouse, son, or daughter 
of a United States citizen or of an 
alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence if it is 
established to the satisfaction of the 
Attorney General that the refusal of 
admission to the United States of 
such immigrant alien would result 
in extreme hardship to the citizen or 
lawfully resident spouse or parent 
of such an alien or, in the case of a 
VAWA self-petitioner, the alien 
demonstrates extreme hardship to 
the alien or the alien’s United 
States citizen, lawful permanent 
resident, or qualified alien parent or 
child. 
 
 Significantly, a formal application for a waiver under this 
section is “the sole method of requesting the exercise of 
discretion under sections 212(g), (h), (i), and (k) of the 
[Immigration and Nationality] Act (“INA”), as they relate to the 
inadmissibility of an alien in the United States.”11  8 C.F.R. § 
                                                 
11 Section 212(i) of the INA codifies, using identical language, 
the “fraud or willful misrepresentation” waiver of 
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245.1(f) (emphasis added).  In addition, a waiver applicant must 
“apply for the related waiver by filing the form designated by 
USCIS, with the fee prescribed in 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(b)(1), and in 
accordance with the form instructions.”  Id. § 212.7(a)(1); see 
also Khan v. Johnson, No. 2:14-CV-06288-CAS(CWX), 2016 
WL 429672, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2016) (“[A]n applicant is 
required to submit a formal application requesting a waiver and 
pay a fee. . . . Unless an applicant complies with these 
regulations, USCIS is not permitted to waive the applicant’s bar 
to admissibility.”).  Saliba does not allege that he complied with 
these formal waiver application processes.   
 
 Although 8 C.F.R. § 245.1 states that the formal waiver 
application process is the sole method for an otherwise 
inadmissible applicant like Saliba to obtain a waiver of 
inadmissibility, he fails to provide any evidence that he applied 
for, or obtained, a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1).  He, 
instead, contends that there is an issue of fact as to whether the 
INS was aware of his fraudulent procurement of TPS when it 
approved his application to adjust his status to that of a LPR in 
2001.  (Pet. ¶¶ 36, 38, 39, 44); see also Appellant’s br. at 10-11. 
 As support, Saliba alleges that his I-485 application for LPR 
status shows that his original A number, assigned when he 
obtained TPS in 1991, was written on his application for LPR 
status in red ink but an INS officer subsequently crossed it out 
using dark colored ink, after which the same person replaced the 
“old” A number with his “new” A number.  (Pet. ¶¶ 20, 38, 39); 
                                                                                                             
inadmissibility authorized by Congress under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(i)(1).  For the sake of consistency, we usually have cited to 
the United States Code sections for provisions that have parallel 
INA citations.  
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see also Appellant’s br. at 10.  Saliba contends that the cross-
outs on the document “show[] that the issue of [his] 
misrepresentation was addressed by the officer reviewing the 
file,” Appellant’s br. at 12, and that through this proposed 
sequence of events, the INS implicitly waived any grounds for 
inadmissibility that may have existed at the time that he became 
an LPR, (e.g., Pet. ¶¶ 22, 44).  
 
 In dealing with the waiver point, we note that we do not 
agree with Saliba that the INS’s apparent crossing out of his 
“old” A number, coupled with the insertion of his “new” A 
number in different colored ink, provide any evidence that a INS 
officer intended to grant him a waiver of inadmissibility.  It is 
clear that the inference that Saliba seeks to draw from his I-485 
application, i.e., that a specific INS officer intended to grant him 
a waiver of inadmissibility, is not the only inference that can be 
drawn from the change of A numbers.  After all, because a new 
number was assigned to a new application, for all we know the 
officer changed the numbers because the officer believed that 
the change was proper procedure inasmuch as Saliba filed 
separate applications for TPS and LPR status.  Yet in order to 
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Saliba must “nudge 
[his] claim[] across the line from conceivable to plausible,” an 
achievement that cannot be accomplished through the type of 
speculative allegations that make up his colored-pens, cross-out 
theory.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974. 
 
 In any event, regardless of the INS officer’s intent, and 
taking the factual allegations of Saliba’s petition as true, the 
circumstances surrounding his I-485 application for LPR status 
are insufficient as a matter of law to constitute a waiver of 
inadmissibility.  As we have indicated, an application for waiver 
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of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1) is “the sole 
method of requesting” such a waiver.  8 C.F.R. § 245.1(f) 
(emphasis added).  Thus, even if the INS reviewing officer 
intended to waive Saliba’s inadmissibility, and even if that 
officer had been fully aware of Saliba’s prior TPS fraud, the 
officer lacked legal authority to waive the bars to Saliba’s 
admissibility.  See Saliba, 2015 WL 5554772, at *5.  In the 
absence of any evidence in the record showing that Saliba was 
eligible for, applied for, and obtained a waiver of inadmissibility 
under the procedures set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1), and its 
implementing regulations, Saliba’s inadmissibility was not 
waived at the time that he became a LPR.  
 
  2.  Failure to Rescind LPR Status within the  
  Five-Year Statute of Limitations in 8 U.S.C. §  
  1256(a)12 
 
 Saliba also contends that the five-year statute of 
limitations that governs commencement of removal proceedings 
and rescission of LPR status under 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) “should 
serve as a waiver” of “known grounds of disability” for 
purposes of his application for naturalization.  (Pet. ¶ 43; see 
also Pet. ¶ 42).  He maintains that the holdings of Garcia and 
Matter of Saunders, 16 I. & N. Dec. 326 (BIA 1977), support his 
assertion that “his misrepresentation implicitly was waived by 
USCIS’s failure to rescind his [LPR] status within five years.”  
(Pet. ¶ 58).  Saliba essentially argues that since the USCIS 
cannot now rescind his LPR status or seek to remove him, it has 
no grounds on which to deny his application for naturalization.  
                                                 
12 The parallel provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act 
is section 246(a).  
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We disagree, and because neither section 1256(a), nor the cases 
interpreting its applicability, support the view that the USCIS 
implicitly waived Saliba’s inadmissibility, we conclude that his 
fraudulent procurement of TPS precludes his attempt to 
naturalize.  
 
 The natural “starting place in our inquiry” with respect to 
8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) is the plain language of the statute.  United 
States v. Introcaso, 506 F.3d 260, 264 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 
1797 (1994)).  When we examine the plain language of section 
1256(a), we are satisfied that it does not affect or implicate 
naturalization eligibility.  The statute provides that: 
 
If, at any time within five years 
after the status of a person has been 
otherwise adjusted under the 
provisions of section 1255 or 1259 
of this title or any other provision 
of law to that of an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence, 
it shall appear to the satisfaction of 
the Attorney General that the 
person was not in fact eligible for 
such adjustment of status, the 
Attorney General shall rescind the 
action taken granting an adjustment 
of status to such person and 
cancelling removal in the case of 
such person if that occurred and the 
person shall thereupon be subject to 
all provisions of this chapter to the 
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same extent as if the adjustment of 
status had not been made. Nothing 
in this subsection shall require the 
Attorney General to rescind the 
alien’s status prior to 
commencement of procedures to 
remove the alien under section 
1229a of this title, and an order of 
removal issued by an immigration 
judge shall be sufficient to rescind 
the alien’s status. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (emphasis added).  By its terms, the statute 
imposes a five-year limitation on rescission of a grant of LPR 
status and removal of aliens.  See Malik v. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 
253, 257 (3d Cir. 2011); Garcia, 553 F.3d at 728.   
 
 Although we seem never to have opined directly on the 
issue, several district courts in this circuit have reached the 
conclusion that “the plain language of the statute does not in any 
way contemplate extension of the limitations period to the 
naturalization process.”  Jin Mei Lin v. Napolitano, No. CIV. A. 
11-6373, 2013 WL 2370588, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 31, 2013), 
aff’d sub nom. Jin Mei Lin v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., 613 F. App’x 207 (3d Cir. 2015); accord Adegoke v. 
Fitzgerald, 784 F. Supp. 2d 538, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2011) 
(“[Petitioner] argues that § 1256(a) extends beyond the 
rescission context and confirms that his LPR status is not void 
for purposes of naturalization. It does not.”); Monge v. Holder, 
No. CIV. A. 09-4949-FLW, 2010 WL 3907363, at *5 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 29, 2010) (“Because the government seeks neither to 
rescind Petitioner’s LPR status nor remove him from the 
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country, 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) does not apply in this case.”).   
 
 Unlike Saliba, we agree with the district courts’ 
recognition in those cases that rescission, removal, and 
naturalization raise “entirely distinct legal questions,” and 
though section 1256(a) deals with rescission and removal, it 
does not concern naturalization.  Ros v. Napolitano, No. 12-CV-
321, 2013 WL 3479419, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 11, 2013); see also 
8 U.S.C. § 1429 (“[T]he findings of the Attorney General in 
terminating removal proceedings or in canceling the removal of 
an alien pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, shall not be 
deemed binding in any way upon the Attorney General with 
respect to the question of whether such person has established 
his eligibility for naturalization as required by this subchapter.”). 
  
 This logical reading of the statute is consistent with our 
holding in Gallimore in which we explained that an alien who 
becomes a LPR despite being “inadmissible” has not been 
“lawfully admitted” for permanent residence.  619 F.3d at 223.  
In that case, the INS granted the alien conditional LPR status in 
July 1994, and later removed conditions on his LPR status in 
August 1996.  Id. at 219.  The alien applied for naturalization 
more than five years later, in December 2001, but the INS 
denied his application and initiated removal proceedings after it 
became aware that he had not disclosed his prior criminal 
conviction.  Id.  Although our analysis in that case focused on 
the issue of the alien’s eligibility for a waiver under INA § 
212(c), we nonetheless held that the alien never was “lawfully 
admitted” for permanent residence, despite the fact that the 
limitations period in section 1256(a) had expired prior to the 
INS’s naturalization denial.  Id. at 224-25.   
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 A holding that an otherwise “unlawful” admission for 
permanent residence can be transformed into a “lawful” 
admission whenever the limitations period has expired under 
section 1256(a) would be inconsistent with Gallimore.  After all, 
such a conclusion would contradict the Gallimore point that an 
alien is not “lawfully admitted” for permanent residence unless 
he strictly complies with the “substantive legal requirements” of 
the immigration laws.  619 F.3d at 224-25.  We are satisfied that 
the substantive compliance prerequisite to the grant of 
citizenship cannot be circumvented by reliance on a statute of 
limitations that by its terms applies only to rescission and 
removal, matters distinct from naturalization.  
 
 Moreover, the cases that Saliba cites to support his 
reading of the statute do not alter our conclusion.  Quite the 
opposite, they confirm that Saliba has confused his right to 
retain his LPR status and remain in this country with a non-
existent entitlement to naturalize.  The first, our decision in 
Garcia, does not speak to section 1256(a)’s effect on 
naturalization at all.  As the District Court explained, the rule 
from Garcia is that the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) cannot, after section 1256(a)’s limitations period has 
expired, initiate removal proceedings based on an alien’s 
improperly obtained LPR status.  Garcia explicitly upheld the 
precedential authority of our earlier decision in Bamidele v INS, 
99 F.3d 557, 565 (3d Cir. 1996), which held that the same 
statute of limitations—though the pre-1996 amendment 
version—barred the initiation of removal proceedings after five 
years if based on improperly granted LPR status.  553 F.3d at 
728 (“We conclude that Bamidele retains its precedential 
authority.”).  The holdings in Garcia and Bamidele are rooted in 
the language of section 1256(a) that deals with rescission of 
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LPR status and removal.  The statute does not include similar 
language dealing with naturalization, and, unsurprisingly, the 
cases therefore do not discuss naturalization.  See Shah v. 
Thompson, No. CIV. A. 2:113082 WJM, 2015 WL 113339, at 
*5 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2015) (reasoning that Garcia does not “disturb 
the well-settled principle that the ‘lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence’ requirement is not met when an alien’s 
adjustment does not comply with the immigration laws”). 
 
 The second case on which Saliba relies—and more 
precisely, the governing opinion from that case—is similarly 
inapposite.  Saliba contends that in “Matter of Saunders . . . it 
was noted that Section 246 ‘should be read as a waiver and 
adjustment of known grounds of disability.’”  (Pet. ¶ 41 (quoting 
Matter of Saunders, 16 I. & N. Dec. 326, 334-335 (BIA 1977) 
(I. Appleman, concurring))).  As an initial matter, and as Saliba 
correctly indicates, this language is drawn from the concurring 
opinion of a single BIA member and not from the BIA’s 
governing opinion.  Id.; see also Concurrence, Black’s Law 
Dictionary, at 331 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “concurrence” as “[a] 
vote cast by a judge in favor of the judgment reached, often on 
grounds differing from those expressed in the opinion or 
opinions explaining the judgment”).  Notwithstanding the source 
of Saliba’s quotation, the issue in Matter of Saunders concerned 
the statute of limitations on rescission of LPR status and 
removal proceedings, and did not involve naturalization.  And as 
the Government explains, the concurring BIA member wrote 
separately to voice his concern that “the majority’s holding 
would allow the INS to skip the rescission process after the five-
year period had run, and go directly to deportation or exclusion 
proceedings.”  Appellee’s br. at 24 (citing Matter of Saunders, 
16 I. & N. Dec. at 334).  Thus, even if the concurrence in Matter 
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of Saunders were the governing opinion, it would be of no 
assistance to Saliba.  
 
 The Government concedes that DHS cannot rescind 
Saliba’s improperly granted LPR status or remove him from this 
country on the basis of the current record,13 Appellee’s br. at 24, 
but it maintains that section 1256(a) does not apply in the 
context of naturalization.  See, e.g., Adegoke, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 
541; Monge, 2010 WL 3907363, at *5.  We find no basis in the 
text of section 1256(a), or the cases interpreting its applicability, 
to reach an opposite conclusion.  Saliba has admitted to 
submitting falsified documents that stated that he was a citizen 
of Lebanon to obtain TPS and later provided dishonest 
responses on his application to become a LPR.  Congress 
unambiguously has stated that naturalization should be reserved 
only for those applicants who can show compliance with the 
statutory requirements for citizenship, see Fedorenko, 449 U.S. 
at 522, 101 S.Ct. at 747; Szehinskyj, 277 F.3d at 334, but Saliba 
has not complied with the immigration laws at any point in the 
process.  Section 1256(a)’s limitations period does not negate 
these facts or waive Saliba’s known grounds of disability for 
purposes of his naturalization application.  
 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
                                                 
13 We are not suggesting that regardless of any future events, the 
Government will never be able to initiate proceedings to remove 
Saliba from this country.  After all, we have no idea of what 
may happen in the future. 
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Court’s September 18, 2015 order dismissing Saliba’s petition 
for review. 
 
 
